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Abstract
This paper reviews NATO’s Operation Allied Force conducted in Kosovo in 1999 
based on the principles of International Humanitarian Law, namely those of distinction, 
proportionality, precaution and limitations on the type of weapons to be used within 
military operations. This document is distributed in two main parts. The first one describes 
NATO’s constitutive treaty by making emphasis in what are considered its most prominent 
articles followed by a presentation of the four principles of jus in bello, mentioned 
previously. The second part deals with the description of four air incidents within the 
Operation aiming at the violation of International Humanitarian Law along with scholars 
opinions regarding the subject matter of discussion as well as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) final decision not to initiate investigations.
This paper is the result of research made through different International Law Journals and 
news from NATO’s official webpage. Finally, it is worth mentioning that it is not pretended to criticize 
neither the arguments presented by scholars opposing NATO’s intervention nor the decision at 
which the ICTY arrived, the aim is to present a case which still has not had consensus among 
International Law analysts but that can help in understanding jus in bello in International Relations.
Nato in Kosovo:
operation allied force viewed from 
the core principles of jus in bello
By Felipe Montoya Pino
Introduction
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an Alliance of 28 
countries from North America and Europe entrusted “to fulfilling the 
goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949”.1 This orga-
nization holds among its main purposes to “safeguard the freedom 
and security of its member countries”2 and the values of democracy, 
individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of dis-
1. North Atalntic Treaty Organization, “What is 
NATO? “ Web site North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
[on line], availabore in: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/what_is_nato.htm,  accesed: 5 april 2010.
 2. Ibíd. 
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putes through both political and military means. Throughout its en-
largements NATO has been cataloged as one of the most successful 
and perdurable military alliances in the history of International Rela-
tions, nevertheless, “[f]rom March 24 to June 10, 1999, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (…) engaged in a bombing campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“FRY”) in response to the 
atrocities committed by Serbian forces against the ethnic Albanian 
population in Kosovo. Code-named “Operation Allied Force,” the cam-
paign resulted in the deaths of approximately 500 innocent civilians 
while injuring more than 800 others”.3 
Although this was meant to be a humanitarian intervention, given the 
way in which the operations were conducted and its results in terms 
of casualties, some scholars argued that NATO had committed war 
crimes and that it should be judged before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) which had jurisdiction in this 
particular case. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to analyze 
the arguments which indicate that such war crimes did occur given 
that “[t]he core rules of international humanitarian law [which] con-
sist of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in 
the attack, as well as the idea of limiting the use of certain types of 
weapons”4 were violated. 
This paper is distributed in two main parts. The first one (1) makes 
a brief introduction on NATO and describes its constitutive treaty by 
making emphasis in what are considered its most important articles 
(1.1), then within the frame of jus in bello the four main principles of 
International Humanitarian Law, mentioned above, are presented and 
described (1.2). The second part (2) focuses on NATO’s “Operation Al-
lied Force” by describing four particular air bombings that, arguably, 
violate the mentioned principles (2.1), and finally a brief analysis is 
made based on the arguments posed by different scholars as well as 
the ones presented by the ICTY (2.2).
1. NATO and the core rules of International 
Humanitarian Law
Several criticisms related to NATO as a pro-democracy organization 
have put its reputation in question. Some authors agree that NATO’s 
raison d’être is mutual confidence and that as such its purposes en-
compass topics beyond national security interest. The debate has dif-
ferent and equally valid arguments, some of them; for example, argue 
that since “[s]everal of its members have at different times in history 
3. Anne-Sophie Massa, “NATO’s Intervention 
in Kosovo and the Decision of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise 
of Prosecutorial Discretion? “Berkeley Journal of In-
ternational Law, vol.24, num. 2, June 2006, p. 611
4. Ibid. , p. 621.
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been non-democratic states”5, the question as to when did NATO get 
its democratic identity shows that the organization has been “clearly 
inconsistent over time in terms of the importance it attributes to dem-
ocratic principles”.6
On the other hand, others say that if a military alliance is “an orga-
nization that is set up with the sole aim of protecting the member 
states from a clearly identified external threat, and that is held to-
gether chiefly as a result of a common perception of such a threat, 
then it seems plausible that NATO has ambitions to, and perceives 
itself as, something more; and there is some evidence to support the 
idea that the ‘new NATO’ has sought to forge a basis of legitimacy for 
itself, and a definition of its own purpose, that are somehow linked to 
the idea of democratic governance”.7
Other authors remain more neutral and state that even if “NATO is 
certainly not the direct causal mechanism for democratization and 
democratic survival (…) official and unofficial NATO alliance ties fa-
cilitate an underlying process that helps reduce external threat, (…) 
[and] [t]his underlying process increases the probability of democrat-
ic transition or consolidation by aiding the settlement of the territo-
rial disagreements that have such a deleterious effect on the state”.8 
Nonetheless, to avoid taking sides, the following section will focus 
only on NATO’s constitutive treaty. Afterwards, the core rules of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law will be briefly described based on analysis 
made by Anne-Sophie Massa, PhD candidate at the Criminal Law De-
partment from Faculty of Law at Maastricht University. 
1.1. The North Atlantic Treaty of April the 4th, 1949
“(…) the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as numerous subsequent docu-
ments and declarations from NATO, emphasize the importance of 
democratic principles. Thus, in the preamble to the treaty it is stated 
that the parties are ‘determined to safeguard the freedom, common 
heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”.9 Principles of the 
UN Charter are commonly mentioned in the NATO treaty, consequent-
ly the parties are committed to act in accordance with them, as cited 
in Article 1, “[t]he Parties undertake (…) to settle any international 
dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means (…) and to 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in 
any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”10
 
5. Helene Sjursen, “On the Identity of NATO”, 
International Affairs, vol. 80 num. 4, p.695.
6. Ibid. , p. 695.
7. Ibid., p.693.
  8. Douglas M Gibler and Jamil A. Sewell, “Ex-
ternal Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO 
Revisited”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 43, 
num. 4, july 2006, p. 416. 
  9. Helene Sjursen, Op. cit., p.691.
 10. The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949. 
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“While for most Europeans Article 5 [mentioned below] was NATO’s 
premier attraction, the North American members were more interest-
ed in Article 2, which called for the strengthening of free institutions 
and the promotion of political stability and material wellbeing through 
international trade and economic cooperation”.11
The military aspect of the treaty can be perceived from Article 3, 
which calls for each party to “maintain and develop [its] individual 
and collective capacity to resist armed attack”.12 Also, Article 4 states 
the opportunity for parties to call for consultations whenever, in their 
opinion, “the territorial integrity, political independence or security of 
any of the Parties is threatened”.13 But “[t]he North Atlantic Treaty’s 
critical component is Article 5, in which the signatories agree that 
“an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all,” and pledge 
to assist one another “by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, such action as [each signatory] deems neces-
sary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area”.14 This article also states that the 
arm attack as well as the measures taken to respond it should be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council and that the actions taken 
to respond to the mentioned attack will cease when the Council has 
taken measures to restore order.
In this sense, Article 6 defines what for NATO constitutes an armed 
attack and Article 7 clarifies that the treaty does not affect in any 
way the obligations and rights under the UN Charter and that it does 
not intend to modify the role of the Security Council as the grantor 
of peace and security. Furthermore, Article 9 establishes a Council 
in which each party shall have representation, a Council able to meet 
“promptly at any time”, and it gives it the freedom to establish as many 
subsidiary bodies as necessary, finally, it urges the creation of a de-
fense committee in charge of the implementation of articles 3 and 5.
Articles 10 to 14 refer to formal things such as the procedure for a 
state to become a party (Article 10), the conditions for the treaty to 
enter into force (Article 11), the possibility of reviewing the treaty by 
request of any party after it has been in force during ten years (Article 
12), the option of notice of denunciation by a party after the treaty 
has been in force for more than twenty years (Article 13), and the 
place of deposit of the treaty (Article 14) that for this purpose was the 
archives of the Government of the United States of America. 
11. Zoltan Barany, “NATO at Sixty”,  Journal of De-
mocracy,  vol. 20, num. 2, April 1 2009, p.110.
12. The North Atlantic Treaty, Op. cit.
13. The North Atlantic Treaty, Op. cit.
14. Zoltan Barany, Op. cit., p.109.
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However, these last five articles are not that important given the 
purpose of the present paper. Finally, it can be said that although 
opinions about NATO’s raison d’être and democratic identity may be 
contradictory, one thing is clear and is that at the moment of consti-
tution and throughout its enlargements “NATO’s members entered 
freely and could not be compelled to take part in it against their will. 
[Also] [t]he Alliance has always had a European secretary-general, 
and its structure has allowed genuine and active participation by 
member states”.15 
1.2 The core rules of International Humanitarian Law
In order to describe the principles of International Humanitarian Law, a 
difference must be made between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. “The 
jus ad bellum, in the first place, consists of the UN Charter rules on re-
sort to force. Thus, states may use force only in response to an armed 
attack (as per Article 51) or with Security Council authorization”.16 
Nevertheless, as it has been observed in International Public Law, 
States may go to war based on one of three situations that come 
from doctrine, namely anticipatory self-defense, national security, or 
humanitarian intervention.
“(…) [T]he state resorting to force must then assess whether the 
use of force meets the requirements of necessity and propor-
tionality. Necessity “determines whether the situation warrants 
the use of armed force”. (…) If so, proportionality then requires 
assessment of the means to accomplish the legitimate objec-
tive. Will the cost of achieving that objective in terms of civilian 
lives lost and destruction of civilian property and the natural 
environment exceed the value of the objective?”17
Alternatively, “[t]he jus in bello consists of the many treaties, rules of 
customary international law, and general principles that govern the 
conduct of force -whether lawful under the jus ad bellum or not”.18 
Special emphasis is to be made on this last remark. The fact that 
whether the war is lawful or not under jus ad bellum, jus in bello still 
applies is critical because sometimes although the justification to 
go to war is lawful under the UN Charter, the means used during the 
conflict are not, and the State that committed such acts must re-
spond before an international court for having violated International 
Humanitarian Law.
15. Zoltan Barany, Op. cit., p.112.
16. Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Reviewed work(s): Ne-
cessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by 
States by Judith Gardam” The American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 100, num. 4, October 
2006, p.973.
17. Ibíd.
 18. Ibíd., p.974.
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International Humanitarian Law (IHL) seeks “to moderate the conduct 
of armed conflict and to mitigate the suffering which it causes. It fol-
lows that persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hos-
tilities, such as civilians, wounded and sick combatants, and prisoners 
of war, must be protected during the conflict and allowed to benefit 
from humanitarian care”. 19 As mentioned before, four main principles 
compose IHL, they are codified in the Additional Protocol I to the Ge-
neva Conventions and they are recognized as International Custom. 
The first principle is that of distinction. It is contained in Article 48 of 
the Additional Protocol I and points that “a war is waged only against 
the armed forces of the enemy and thus requires distinctions to be 
drawn between civilians and combatants and between civilian prop-
erty and military objectives (…) The civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. In other 
words, the civilian population and civilian property (…) must be pro-
tected in all circumstances”.20 Hence, defining what is considered a 
military object is crucial when applying the principle of distinction. 
According to Additional Protocol I “military objectives are limited to 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage”.21
Nowadays it has become difficult to identify some objects which are 
used both for civilian and military purposes. These “dual purpose ob-
jects” as defined by Annie-Sophie Massa have to be clearly identi-
fied as objects that contribute effectively to military action, because 
if there is room for doubt, they are presumed to be civilian, as stated 
in Article 52(3) of the Protocol: “In case of doubt whether an object 
which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of 
worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make 
an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not 
to be so used”.22
The principle of proportionality comes in second place. It “prohibits 
an attack that “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated”.23 In addition, the principle of 
precaution has been codified in Article 57 of the Additional Protocol 
I (AP I), where a series of precautions are to be taken at “different 
levels of the military hierarchy in order to avoid civilian casualties”.24 
Some of these precautions are to spare the civilian population, civil-
19.  Anne-Sophie Massa, Op. cit., p.621.
 20. Ibíd.
21. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977.]
22 Ibíd.
23. Anne-Sophie Massa, Op. cit., p.623.
24. Ibíd., p.624.
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ians and civilian objects; to verify that the targets to be attacked are 
strictly military objectives; to cancel or suspend the attack if special 
conditions are presented25; to give an effective advance warning for 
the attacks that may affect the civilian population, among others.
Finally, the use of weapons is mentioned in Article 35 (3) of the (AP I) 
which “bans the use of weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous in-
jury or unnecessary suffering.” As far as the protection of the environ-
ment is concerned Article 35(3) excludes the use of means of warfare 
that would cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment”.26 The use of weapons is mentioned in other 
conventions where the use of certain types of weapons is prohibited 
since they violate “the laws or customs of war”.
The violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality and the 
use of weapons constitutes a war crime, and although the violation of 
the principle of precaution does not constitute a war crime itself “if a 
violation of the principle leads to a direct attack on civilians or civilian 
property, or an indiscriminate attack, the lack of precaution indirectly 
contributes to the commission of war crimes”.27 These elements de-
scribed above show that actions committed in war must be carefully 
regulated since a single imprudence can constitute the violation of a 
principle that is both codified in treaties ratified by most countries in 
the world and an International Custom. Now that some concepts of 
International Humanitarian Law have been explained, this paper will 
focus on describing NATO’s Operation Allied Force with the purpose of 
analyzing specific events in the light of jus in bello.
2. Operation Allied Force and its 
consequences based on jus in bello 
After the Rambouillet negotiations failed and due to the continuous 
attacks against the Albanian population that caused a massive flood 
of refugees, NATO decided to implement Operation Allied Force with 
the objective of putting an end to Serbs’ actions. “However, the NATO 
air strikes, far from stopping the humanitarian crisis, “added a new 
dimension” to it, thereby contributing to the greatest exodus of refu-
gees since the Second World War”.28
“On June [10] 1999, [after months of air strikes] the United 
Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 to pro-
vide for the deployment of international civil and security pres-
ences to Kosovo under the auspices of the UN in accordance 
25 “If it becomes apparent that the objective is 
not a military one or is subject to special protec-
tion or that the attack may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated” Article 57 (2b) Additional Protocol I.
26. Anne-Sophie Massa, Op. cit., p.625-626.
27. Ibíd., p.625.
28. Ibíd., p.613.
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with a peace plan agreed to by the FRY [ The Military Technical 
Agreement]. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (…), 
the Security Council authorized the UN Secretary General to 
establish an international civil presence to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo [UNMIK], and further authorized the 
Member States of the UN and relevant international organiza-
tions to establish an international security presence, with sub-
stantial NATO participation and operating under ‘unified com-
mand and control’, in order to establish a safe environment for 
all people in Kosovo”.29 
However, during the intervention questions about the way in which 
NATO was conducting the attacks started rising. NATO argued that it 
was not violating the rules of warfare and that rather it was following 
Additional Protocol I, but the incidents occurred probed wrong in the 
eyes of some scholars. The purpose of this section is to describe both 
briefly and concisely the incidents in question which later will be use-
ful to analyze in the light of International Humanitarian Law.
2.1 Four incidents reflecting Operation Allied 
Force’s controversial planning and 
implementation phases
“On April 23, 1999, NATO aircrafts bombed the Serbian State Televi-
sion and Radio in Belgrade without denying that it was their intended 
target. The nature of the target is at issue in this case”.30 It has al-
ready been mentioned that the nature of the objective to be attacked 
has to be clearly defined, especially with the denominated “dual-use 
objects”. The ICRC has included television stations within the catego-
ry of potential military objectives, however, it clarifies that the nature 
of the objective has to be established in a case-by-case basis. The at-
tacks occurred past 2 AM, however, NATO forces knew that the build-
ing was staffed twenty-four hours.
Also, even if the objective is cataloged as a military one, in order to 
be destroyed the military advantage obtained by doing so has to be 
considerable. Where no or few military advantage is obtained, the 
destruction of the target constitutes a violation of jus in bello. The 
reasons given by NATO to justify the attacks were that the Radio Tele-
vision Station “was playing a propaganda role in the conflict, [and 
also] contended that the television station was a dual-purpose object 
because it was part of the military broadcast network”.31 Three hours 
later after the bombing occurred, the broadcasting recommenced. 
29. Anne-Sophie Massa, Op. cit., p.627.
30. Ibíd., p.628.
31. Ibíd., p.630.
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“During an attack that occurred in the middle of the day on April 12, 
1999, two bombs hit a civilian passenger train while it was crossing a 
bridge. The object of the attack was the bridge, not the train. Where-
as the dropping of the first bomb on the train is attributable to the 
Alliance’s failure to verify the train schedules and the high altitude 
that apparently prevented the pilots from getting a precise view of the 
target at the time of the attack; the dropping of the second bomb is 
inexplicable”.32 This was known as the Grdelica Railroad Bridge Inci-
dent, the explanations given NATO stated that the pilot who dropped 
the second bomb “had understood the mission was to destroy the 
bridge regardless of the cost in terms of civilian casualties”.
The third event is known as The Djakovica-Decan Road Incident. Sev-
eral ethnic Albanians were killed and over 100 were hurt when NATO, 
on April 14; bombed several refugee convoys. At first NATO denied its 
responsibility arguing that the attack had been conducted by Yugo-
slav forces, but then it “admitted that aircrafts from the Alliance had 
carried out the bombing but argued that the pilots thought they were 
attacking military vehicles”.33 After the attack there was no evidence 
that military vehicles were present among the civilian population, and 
even if there were, Article 50 (3) of the Additional Protocol I states 
that “[t]he presence within the civilian population of individuals who 
do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the 
population of its civilian character”.34 It is worth mention that after 
the attack, NATO changed the altitude at which the pilots were re-
quired to fly from 15.000 feet and above to as low as 6.000 feet “in 
order to get a visual confirmation of the absence of civilians in the 
vicinity of the target (…)”.35
Finally, The Nis Incident that occurred on May the 7th at noon con-
sisted in NATO dropping cluster bombs in two residential areas of the 
mentioned city. The bombs were dropped around the market place 
and the main hospital, fourteen civilians were killed and about thirty 
got injured. “According to Amnesty International, the bombs fell on 
a busy part of town at a time when people were out in the streets 
and at the market, not protecting themselves in the bomb shelters 
where they had spent the night”.36 NATO argued that the incident had 
resulted from a weapon that had missed its objective given that the 
real targets were “a nearby airfield used by the Serbian army and 
the aircraft, air defense systems, and support vehicles located there, 
<<targets to which cluster munitions are appropriately suited>>”.37 
After the incident, United States issued a directive where it asked for 
the restriction of the use of cluster bombs.
32. Ibíd., p.630.
33. Ibíd., 631.
34. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Op. cit.
35. Anne-Sophie Massa, Op. cit., p.631-632.
36. Ibíd., p. 632
37. Ibíd.
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Having described the four incidents that occurred in the course of 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force, this paper will now focus on presenting 
some arguments from scholars pointing at NATO’s violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, in addition, arguments defending NATO’s 
actions are illustrated, given that it is considered necessary to take 
into account both sides in the conflict. As mentioned before, this pa-
per does not intend to take sides but just to present the case within 
the frame of IHL.
 
2.2 Arguments concerning NATO’s actions in Kosovo
This section presents some arguments referred to the events men-
tioned supra. In first place the Radio-Television Station (RTS) incident 
posses several doubts as to the targeting of the (RTS) as a military 
objective by NATO, and because no significant military advantage 
was gotten given that three hours after the bombings occurred the 
broadcasting restarted. Also it is argued that there was no evidence 
that the target was used by the Serb military broadcast network for 
command, control and communication purposes. Some scholars ar-
gue that whether the (RTS) was a military objective and a significant 
advantage was acquired, NATO still violated the principle of precau-
tion given that it did not warn the people working at the place in ques-
tion knowing that it was occupied twenty-four hours, as Anne-Sophie 
Massa states “it is difficult to see how the probable death or injury of 
a substantial number of civilians could not be qualified as excessive 
when compared to an anticipated military advantage of disrupting 
broadcasting for a few hours past 2 AM”.38
With regard to the Grdelica Railroad Bridge incident the main argu-
ment posted is that the pilot must have realized that the bomb had 
hit the train, not the bridge, and thus abstain of dropping the sec-
ond one. The bombing of the train, clearly a civilian objective, poses 
the suggestion that NATO’s pilot committed “willful killing of civilian 
and indiscriminate attack causing excessive civilian casualties or 
damage”.39 Different arguments struggle to define if the violations 
were imputable to the pilot or to his superiors, and hypothesis con-
cerning the knowledge of the commanders about the train give dif-
ferent degrees of responsibility to both the person who executed the 
action and the ones who ordered it, but among scholars it is clear that 
NATO had committed war crimes in this particular incident.
The third Incident also points at the willful killing of civilians since 
precautions were not taken by NATO before the air strikes occurred. 
38. Ibíd., p.629.
39. Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia
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Negligence is also imputed given that the pilots “mistook the convoy 
for a military column”40 plus NATO acknowledged that after the attack 
no aircraft descended to “double check” if it was indeed a military 
target. In this case the debate of imputing individual criminal respon-
sibilities to the pilots and their superiors is also present. Finally, argu-
ments related with the Nis Incident point at an inappropriate choice 
of weapons and a violation of the principle of distinction. The former 
can be explained given that NATO’s commandants knew that the lo-
cation of the military target lay near civilians and according with this 
they should have used other type of armory, the latter is explained by 
the following statement:
[t]he fact that cluster weapons were used on a target in proxim-
ity to a civilian area, and at a time of day when civilians were on 
the streets and most likely to be harmed, raised serious con-
cerns as to whether NATO was indeed taking the proper steps 
to distinguish between military targets and civilians and civilian 
objects, and whether it was taking all the necessary precau-
tions to ensure that civilians were not put at risk.41
Opinions by NGO’s, scholars and some states arguing that the events 
mentioned deserved a proper investigation, led to ICTY Prosecutor 
Louise Arbour to establish a Committee whose objective was to deter-
mine if there was sufficient basis to start an investigation on the way 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force was conducted. “[O]n June 2, 2000, 
after considering her team’s assessment of NATO’s conduct in the 
campaign, the Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte, who had taken 
over for former Prosecutor Louise Arbour (…) , concluded “that there 
[was] no basis for opening an investigation into any of the allegations 
or into other incidents related to the NATO air campaign.”42
The Prosecutor argued that although some mistakes were commit-
ted, knowing that NATO had not made “deliberate targeting of civil-
ians or unlawful military targets” was enough not to proceed with 
an investigation. This decision generated different feelings among 
people, some defending the conclusion at which the Prosecutor 
had arrived while other claimed that political considerations had 
biased her judgment.  
40. Anne-Sophie Massa, Op. cit., p.631.
41. Ibíd., p.632.
42. Ibíd., p. 611.
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Conclusions
“Although the use of military force in extreme circumstances for 
humanitarian purposes may be arguably justified, it has to be 
said, especially with hindsight, that the 1999 NATO Operation 
Allied Force against Serbia over Kosovo raises in that respect 
some serious questions and doubts”.43
This paper has dealt with NATO’s Operation Allied Force conducted 
in Kosovo in 1999 which lead to the demise of Serb forces attacking 
Albanian population, but also to the death of civilians in particular 
air strikes conducted within the conflict. The fact that at the moment 
there is not yet a consensus among scholars about NATO’s responsi-
bilities shows that jus in bello principles although recognized within 
the International Community are not always easy to apply and have to 
be analyzed in a case-by-case basis. Some important groups like Am-
nesty International point that an investigation of the facts was neces-
sary; others go beyond and argue that there was an abusive exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion within the final decision not to investigate. 
Nevertheless, as it has been mentioned supra, the purpose of this pa-
per is limited to present the case within the frame of International Hu-
manitarian Law, thus inviting the reader to research deeper into the 
subject and analyze more arguments posted by outstanding scholars 
within International Law.
The present paper has been structured in two parts. Within the first 
one a few arguments concerning NATO’s democratic identity were pre-
sented and its Constitutive Treaty was described. Then jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello were mentioned followed by a presentation on the 
core principles of the latter (i.e. the principle of distinction, propor-
tionality, precaution and use of weapons). The second part described 
four incidents occurred within the Kosovo war that arguably violate 
the principles already mentioned and to conclude some arguments 
concerning both the events and the principles were explained. 
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